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CHOOSING LAW WITH AN
EYE ON THE PRIZE
FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE.

Dordrecht,

Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993. x + 265 pp.
Reviewed by Russell J. Weintraub*
INTRODUCTION

This book is a reworked and updated version of Professor Friedrich
Juenger's 1983 General Course on Private International Law given at the
Hague at the invitation of the Hague Academy of International Law.1 The
invitation to lecture for the Hague Academy is a singular honor and
reflects the esteem with which Professor Juenger's scholarship is held
internationally. I have known him for many years, and we have put on a
dog and pony show, debating one another at symposia and American
Association of Law Schools meetings. Deep down, however, we agree on
the two points that matter most. Legal analysis should be free of cant, and
the law applicable to a transjurisdictional problem should be chosen with
an eye on the prize 2 - justice. We differ on details, sometimes disputing
what is just in particular circumstances, but more often disagreeing about
how to grasp the prize.
No subject is more in need of straight talk than the subject of conflict
of laws. Professor Juenger begins by quoting that perennial favorite, Dean
Prosser's description of the conflict of laws as "a dismal swamp filled
with quaking quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors
who theorize about mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible
jargon."3 Professor Juenger finds the subject of conflict of laws still
"mired in mystery and confusion." 4 In this book, he adds to his attempts
to dispel the fog. He begins with the factual statements of three actual
cases triggering international conflict of laws problems5 - an airplane

* Professor of Law and holder of the John B. Connally Chair in Civil Jurisprudence, The
University of Texas School of Law. New York University, B.A. (1950); Harvard University
Law School, J.D. (1953).
1. FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE i&(1993).

2. The phrase is borrowed from a far more heroic search for justice, the civil rights
movement. See JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS,
1954-1965 (1987).
3. William Prosser, Interstate Publication,51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953).
4. JUENGER, supra note 1, at 1.
5. h4. at 2-3.
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crash,6 damage to an oil rig while in tow from Louisiana to Italy,7 and a
divorce of citizens of different countries in a third country.' He uses these
cases throughout the book to illustrate points and test solutions.9

After this short introduction, Juenger begins with a history of choice
of law jurisprudence,' ° taking the reader from ancient Greece and Rome
through the early development of the subject in Europe, England, and the
United States. What might be a dry history lesson in other hands is a
fascinating intellectual exercise. The central theme is that in the world of
ideas there is nothing new." The reader will probably feel a pang of pity

for the poor wretch who, lacking Professor Juenger's linguistic and
comparative talents, reinvents the wheel but does not manage to smooth
off all the comers. Professor Juenger traces the "better law" approach to
medieval times 12 and "interest analysis" back at least 400 years.' 3 In this
chapter he sounds the themes that are played throughout the book disdain for both unilateral and multilateral approaches to choice of law 4
and a preference for shaping new rules reflecting the best elements of
5
different legal cultures.'
In the next chapter he blasts the classic territorial, multilateral method
of choosing law.' 6 The purpose of this method was to insulate the result

6. In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
7. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
8. Judgment of 11 July 1968, (Cardo v. Cardo), 94 BGE II 65 (Switz.).
9. See, e.g., JUENGER, supra note 1, at 48, 52, 61, 64, 137, 208, 213, 220.
10. Id., ch. 1.
11. Id. at 6.
12. Id. at 12. As the term suggests, the "better law" approach is that when choosing
between the laws of different jurisdictions, the law should be chosen that best responds to
modern social and economic conditions. See Elliott E. Cheatham & Willis L.M. Reese, Choice
of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 980 (1952) (stating that a court should apply
the law that "is in tune with the times" rather than one that "is thought to drag on the coat tails
of civilization").
13. JUENGER, supra note 1, at 19. "Interest analysis" focuses on the policies underlying
conflicting laws and, if there is only one jurisdiction that will experience the consequences
addressed by these policies, applies the law of that jurisdiction. See WILLIS L.M. REESE ET AL.,
CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 487 (9th ed. 1984) (quoting a written statement by Brainerd

Currie that a court "should apply the law of the only interested state.").
14. JUENGER, supra note 1, at 13-15. A "unilateral" analysis focuses on the proper reach
of the forum's law. A "multilateral" analysis utilizes neutral factors to choose between the
conflicting laws of different jurisdictions. See Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal
Extraterritorialityand Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1232 (1992)
(explaining the difference between "unilateral" and "multilateral" approaches to choice of law).
Traditionally, factors used in multilateral analysis have been territorial. In the United States, the
classic territorial choice-of-law rule for torts was the application of the law of the place of
injury. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-78 (1934).
15. JUJENGOE,
supra note 1, at 16.

16. Id., ch. 2 ("The Classical Choice-of-Law Method").
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from the selection of the forum.' It did not achieve this goal, because
different states could not agree on the rules and, even when they did
agree, there was sufficient play in the joints that skillful advocates and
judges could manipulate the system to produce a desired result." In this
chapter, Juenger reveals the one issue on which he agrees with common
wisdom: in contract conflicts cases, the parties should have autonomy to
choose their own law.19 Alas, he should have maintained his iconoclastic
stance on this issue. Common wisdom is always suspect, and it is wrong
with regard to party autonomy.'
Juenger notes the growth of public law and the unilateral approach
to determining its territorial reach. 2' He also traces the development of
"public policy" as an escape from territorial choice-of-law rules,22 but he
fails to note how the current result-selective approach has changed that
doctrine's proper use.23
Next, Juenger reviews recent changes in approaches to choice of law
in the United States7 4 He condemns these developments root and branch.
He views Brainerd Currie's "interest analysis" '2 as a pretext for applying
the law of the forum and doomed to failure because of the impossibility
of reliably discerning policies underlying competing rules in different
jurisdictions.26 He describes the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws
as "a mixture of discordant approaches" 27 and finds judicial opinions
attempting to apply the new methods hopelessly confused.2"

17. Id. at 47.

18. Id. at 50, 70, 78, 80.
19. Id. at 55.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. JUENGER, supra note 1, at 70.

22. Id. at 80.
23. See infra Part II.
24. JUENGER, supra note 1, ch. 3 ("The American Conflicts Revolution").
25. Brainerd Currie advocated an approach to choice of law that focused on the purposes
underlying the different laws of the states having contacts with the parties and the transaction.
His major work is collected in BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1963). Even though apparently unaware of its European origins that can be traced back
at least 400 years. Professor Currie never claimed to have invented interest analysis. For a
formulation that preceded Currie's work by a dozen years, see Paul Freund, ChiefJustice Stone
and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1216-17, 1223-24 (1946). Professor Currie
acknowledged his debt to Professor Freund. See Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts:
A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227, 235 n.18 (1958).
26. JUENGER, supra note 1, at 132-33.

27. Id. at 105-06.
28. Id. at 106-23.
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Juenger continues this bashing of interest analysis in the next chapter29
and again sounds the theme of applying new law, fashioned from existing
laws, to resolve international conflicts problems.3°
The last chapter' is the heart of the book in which he expounds his
suggestion that law should be chosen from the best the world has to offer
and that the choice not be limited to states that have contacts with the
parties and the transaction. 32 Then, shocked by his own audacity, he uncharacteristically flinches and suggests, as a fall-back approach, the use
of alternative references to select, from among states connected to the
parties and the transaction, the law that best reflects modern trends and
doctrine.33 He provides an example of such an alternative reference rule
for conflicts cases involving products liability' and, to further illustrate
an alternative reference solution, revisits the three cases that he described
35
at the outset.
In the rest of this article, I consider these major themes. First, I
comment on the contrast between unilateral and multilateral approaches
to choice of law and on the utility of a unilateral analysis of the territorial
reach of public law, such as antitrust law. 36 This discussion includes a
critique of a United States Supreme Court opinion from the end of the
1992 Term, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California.37 This major
decision on the territorial reach of U.S. antitrust law split the Court 5-4,
with both the majority and minority opinions lacking cogency.
Second, I come to the defense of the U.S. conflicts revolution arguing
that there is less chaos than appears, 3' and that some of the confusing
judicial opinions are the result of judges (or perhaps, more appropriately,
counsel) not understanding the implications of an approach that takes
account of the content and polices of conflicting laws. Third, I focus on
Professor Juenger's major theme - the use of newly-fashioned super law
to resolve international choice-of-law problems. 39 I give examples of

29. Id. at 151-85.
30. Id. at 165-73.

31. Id. at 191-232.
32. Id. at 192-94.
33. Id. at 195.
34. Id. at 196-97.

35. Id. at 208-22.
36. See infra part I.
37. 113 S.Ct. 2891 (1993).
38. Compare "Wagner's music is better than it sounds." See A NEW DICTIONARY OF
QUOTATIONS ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES FROM ANCIENT AND MODERN SOURCES 1260 (Henry
L. Mencken ed., 1942) ("Author unidentified: ascribed to S.L. Clemens (Mark Twain), E.W.
(Bill) Nye, and others.").
39. See infra part III.
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multilateral conventions and a contract in a recent case 4° that utilize this
device. The contract in issue may strike the reader as brilliantly innovative or as a product worthy of Larry, Moe, and Curly."' Finally, I address
Professor Juenger's fall-back choice, an alternative reference approach to
choice of law. 42 I evaluate his proposal for products liability and criticize
his advocacy of party autonomy for choice of law in contracts cases.
I. UNILATERALISM AND MULTILATERALISM

I have stated my understanding of the difference between unilateral
and multilateral approaches to choice of law. 3 I believe that a multilateral
approach, seeking a forum-neutral solution to choice of law, can and
should focus on the content and policies of domestic rules. Professor
Juenger employs the terms differently, using "unilateral" to refer to
attempts to choose law by analyzing the policies underlying domestic
rules, and "multilateral" to describe choice that turns on neutral factors,
typically territorial, that are independent of the content of the law chosen. 44 The difference between us is one of degree and, as Professor
Juenger notes in quoting Savigny, unilateralism
and multilateralism are
45
"but opposite sides of the same coin."
Perhaps the best current illustration of the contest between unilateral
and multilateral approaches is determining the extraterritorial reach of
U.S. antitrust law/'6 The solutions advocated span the spectrum from
chauvinistic unilateralism to selfless mulilateralism, and beyond: (1) apply
U.S. law whenever conduct abroad intentionally produces some substantial effect here that our law is designed to prevent;47 (2) presume that U.S.
law applies when there are significant and foreseeable effects here but,
like all true presumptions, this could be rebutted in rare circumstances,
primarily by comparing the seriousness of the effects in the United States
with the importance of the foreign governmental policy that permits those

40.
(appeal
41.
42.

Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Constr. Ltd., 2 W.L.R. 262 (H.L. 1993)
taken from Eng.).
The "Three Stooges" who made a series of classic slapstick motion pictures.
See infra part IV.

43. See supra note 14.
44. JUENGER, supra note 1, at 154, 156.

45. Id. at 35.
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-31 (1988).
47. This is the approach apparently taken by the bare majority in Hartford Fire Ins. Co.
v. California, 113 S.Ct. 2891, 2909-11 (1993). A possible exception might exist if the
defendant acting abroad could not comply with both U.S. and foreign law. Id. at 2910-11. For
a discussion of the majority opinion, see infra notes 62-74 and accompanying text.
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effects;8 (3) apply U.S. law only when this is reasonable in the light not
only of effects in the United States, but also of a host of territorial and
policy-oriented factors, such as those in the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law;49 (4) apply our law only if the United States has
the "most significant relationship" to the parties and the transaction, a
standard "more restrictive than [a] 'reasonableness' requirement;" ' (5) do
not apply U.S. antitrust law to conduct abroad unless Congress specifically so provides.5"
There is no better example of the confusion and disagreement over
the extraterritorial application of our antitrust law than the United States
Supreme Court's Parthian shot of the 1992 Term, HartfordFireInsurance
Co. v. California.52 An action was brought under the Sherman Act against
U.S. and English insurance companies, alleging a conspiracy that had
succeeded in changing the form of commercial general liability insurance
sold in the United States. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying
the balancing approach it had first used in TimberlaneLumber Co. v. Bank
of America,53 decided that application of the Sherman Act was proper.'
The Timberlane factors that the court balanced were "The Degree of
Conflict With Foreign Law or Policy, '55 "The Nationality or Allegiance
of the Parties and the Locations or Principal Places of Business of the
Corporations, 56 "The Extent to Which Enforcement by Either State Can

48. See Russell J. Weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and Security
Laws: An Inquiry into the Utility of a "Choice-of-law" Approach, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 1829

(1992). An example of a case in which the presumption in favor of U.S. public law should
probably have been rebutted despite foreseeable effects in the United States, is Consolidated
Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, amended, 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 492 U.S. 939 (1989), in which U.S. residents held only 2.5% of the shares of aforeign
company that was the target of a hostile takeover. The Second Circuit upheld an injunction
against the tender offer worldwide pending corrective disclosure, even though the offer
complied with foreign law. Id. at 254 n.1.
49. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(2) (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].

50. See Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW
& POL'v INT'L Bus. 1, 88 (1992).
51. This is the position Justice Scalia apparently would take if free to write on ablank slate:
"[t]he Sherman Act contains similar 'boilerplate language,' [broad provisions covering "any
activity in commerce,"] and if the question were not governed by precedent, it would be worth
considering whether the presumption [against extraterritoriality] controls the outcome here."
Hartford, 113 S.Ct. at 2918 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. 113 S.Ct. 2891 (1993).
53. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
54. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919 (9thCir. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, and remanded, 113 S.Ct. 2891 (1993).
55. Id. at 932.
56. Id. at 933.
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be Expected to Achieve Compliance, 57 "The Relative Significance of
Effects on the United States as Compared With Those Elsewhere,.. "The
Extent to Which There is Explicit Purpose to Harm or Affect United States
Commerce,"59 and "The Foreseeability of the Effects on American Commerce." The court found that despite conflict with British policy, "[tihe
comity factors of Timberlane" overwhelmingly favored the application of
U.S. law to the actions of the English defendants.6
The opinion, by Justice Souter,62 for a bare majority of the Court,
held that application of U.S. law was proper. He reasoned as follows.
Even if a U.S. court should sometimes decline to apply our law when acts
abroad cause consequences in the United States, comity did not counsel
against applying the Sherman Act in this case. 63 "The only substantial
question in this case is whether 'there is in fact a true conflict between
domestic and foreign law."'" There is no such conflict here because the
English defendants do not "claim that their compliance with the laws of
both countries [the United Kingdom and the United States] is . . .
impossible."'65 "We have no need in this case to address other considerations that might inform a decision to refrain from the exercise of
jurisdiction on the grounds of international comity. '
This key passage in Justice Souter's opinion has two possible meanings. It might mean that a comity analysis, such as that provided by the
Restatement (Third) of ForeignRelations Law, 67 and applied by the Ninth
Circuit in the opinion below,6 is inapplicable in the absence of a clear
conflict between the commands of the two sovereigns. If this is what

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 934.

61. Id.
62. Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and White. Justice

White has been replaced by Justice Ruth B. Ginsburg. When on the District of Columbia
Circuit, Judge Ginsburg wrote the opinion in Gustafson v. International Progress Enters., 832
F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1987), allowing recovery under the District of Columbia worker's
compensation law for a worker killed in Saudi Arabia. Judge Ginsburg stated that the worker's

compensation law was properly applicable to "a foreign enterprise deliberately setting up shop
here, to recruit metropolitan Washington area workers, and continuously develop U.S. supply
sources for projects abroad." 832 F.2d at 641. Justice Blackmun has retired and, as of this

writing, his replacement has not been appointed and confirmed.
63. Hartford, 113 S.Ct. at 2911 (Souter, J.).
64. Id. (quoting Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. Distict Court, 482 U.S. 522,

555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
65. Hartford, 113 S.Ct. at 2911 (Souter, J.).

66. Id.
67. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
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Justice Souter meant, his analysis is inconsistent with the Restatement.
The comity or balancing factors of section 403(2) are applicable even if
one country does not require actions prohibited by the other. 69 If Justice
Souter would require a "sovereign compulsion"7 defense, he would allow
less room for moderating the extraterritorial application of law than
would be available even under a strong presumption in favor of applying

U.S. antitrust law when acts abroad cause effects in the United States.7'
On the other hand, Justice Souter may simply be saying that it is
clear, under any form of comity analysis, that it is reasonable to apply
U.S. law to the English defendants because the defendants intended to,
and did,. cause substantial anticompetitive effects in the United States.72
The alleged conspiracy of English and U.S. insurers and reinsurers was

effective to remove from the U.S. insurance market liability coverage for
harms caused by events such as pollution and products such as asbestos.73
Therefore, detailed comity analysis is not necessary, nothing short of a
"sovereign compulsion"'74 defense can avail the defendants, and such a
defense is not present on the facts of this case. If this is what Justice
Souter meant, I agree with his analysis, although I would have preferred
that this were stated less cryptically.

69. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 49, § 403, cmt. e: "[s]ubsection (3) [of § 403]
applies only when one state requires what another prohibits, or where compliance with the
regulations of two states ... is otherwise impossible." Subsection 3, however, applies only after
the comity factors of Subsection 2 have been applied and indicate that "it would not be
unreasonable for each of two states to exercise jurisdiction over a person or activity .... " Id.
Justice Scalia points this out. Hartford, 113 S.Ct. at 2922 (Scalia J., dissenting).
70. See Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Notice of Antitrust Guidelines for
International Operations, 53 Fed. Reg. 21,584, 21,596 (1988) (stating that, under circumstances
stated in the Guidelines, "the Department will not prosecute anticompetitive conduct that has
been compelled by a foreign sovereign.").
71. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
72. Justice Souter does state that "[a]ssuming that the FTAIA's [Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1988)] standard [direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect on commerce] affects this case ... the conduct alleged plainly meets its
requirements." Hartford, 113 S.Ct. at 2909 n.23.
73. The Court in Hartford noted:
The ISO [Insurance Services Office, an association of insurers that is the primary
source of support services in the United States for commercial general liability
insurance] eventually [yielded to pressure from the conspirators and] released
standard language for [commercial liability] policies; that language included a
retroactive date in the claims-made version [so that claims would not be covered if
based on an event that caused harm before the retroactive date but was not discovered until after that date], and an absolute pollution exclusion ... in both [occurrence and claims-made] versions.
Hartford, 113 S.Ct. at 2899:
74. See supra note 70.
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The four dissenters, in an opinion by Justice Scalia," agreed with the
Ninth Circuit's comity approach, but not with its result. Applying the
factors listed in Restatement § 403, the dissenters would dismiss the
action against the English defendants. In arriving at this conclusion,
however, Justice Scalia distorts section 403(2). When he quotes from
section 403(2)(a), the territorial factor, he omits the words "or has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory."7 6 If he
had not deleted this language, he could not have said "[riarely would
these [section 403(2)] factors point more clearly against application of
U.S. law.""n On the contrary, rarely would application of U.S. law more
clearly be reasonable under section 403(2).
Justice Scalia also argues that U.S. insurance companies are exempted
from federal antitrust law and that therefore any comity analysis would
also exempt English insurance companies. 78 The reason for the exemption,
however, is that in the United States, insurance is heavily regulated by the
states.79 This regulation supplies the protection against conspiracies in
restraint of trade that otherwise would be provided by federal antitrust
laws. In order to accord a similar exemption to English insurers, it would
have to be determined that the English insurance regulators provided
protection against restraints on competition comparable to that provided
by state regulation in the United States. English regulation does not
provide adequate protection if, as the English insurers contended, their
conduct was privileged under English law.'

II.

THE CONFLICTS REVOLUTION

Ironically, Professor Juenger indicts U.S. innovations in choice of law
for producing chaos8 at the moment when judges and scholars are
arriving at a consensus. There is widespread agreement that law must be

75. Joined by Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Thomas.
76. Hartford, 113 S.Ct. at 2921 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Sec. 403(2)(a) states:

[A relevant factor to determine the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction to
prescribe is] the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial,direct,
andforeseeable effect upon or in the territory ....
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 49, § 403(2)(a) (emphasis added):
77. Hartford, 113 S.Ct. at 2921 (Scalia, J.,dissenting).

78. Id. at 2921. The exemption, which is subject to some exceptions, is provided by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1988).
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).

80. The English insurers asserted that their conduct "was perfectly consistent with British
law and policy." Hartford, 113 S.Ct. at 2910.
81. JUENGER, supra note 1, at 105-06.

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 15:705

chosen with knowledge of its content and with a view of the consequences that the choice is likely to produce in states that have contacts
with the parties and the transaction.82 If by condemning the current
methods of choosing law as "mired in mystery and confusion,"83 Professor Juenger means that answers are not easy or automatic, then that is
certainly so. The struggle between certainty and predictability on one
hand, and justice in the individual case on the other, is as old as the law.
The sensible solution lies not at either pole but in the accommodation of
both goals: rules that are administerable by the members of a learned
profession with reasonable consistency and that provide satisfactory
responses to the underlying social problems addressed by the rules.
Particularly in a system such as ours, largely based on case precedent, the
only "rule" worthy of the name is one that is an epitome of a series of
cases that are widely regarded as having reached just and sensible results.
Any other common law "rule" is written on sand at low tide.
To be sure, not all cases applying the new choice-of-law techniques
display an adequate understanding of those approaches or of their implications for classic doctrine. Judges are not dumb, just busy, and it is the
role of counsel to provide the necessary assistance. Juenger discusses
three New York cases often used to illustrate the change from territorial
to content-sensitive choice of law" - Loucks v. StandardOil Co. of New
York, 5 Mertz v. Mertz, 6 and IntercontinentalHotels Corp. (PuertoRico)
v. Golden. 7 These cases focus on the issue of whether "public policy"
prevents a New York court from applying the different law of another
state. Loucks and Mertz represent disparate views of public policy while
Intercontinental Hotels, decided a year and a half after the court had
adopted a content-sensitive approach to choice of law,88 is intended to
demonstrate that everything is up to date in Albany. Intercontinental
Hotels, however, fails to grasp how the new analysis has transformed the
proper use of public policy.
In Loucks, Judge Cardozo applies the Massachusetts measure of
wrongful death recovery to a case arising from a traffic accident in that
state, even though the Massachusetts measure, unlike that of New York,

82. See Russell J. Weintraub, An Approach to Choice of Law That Focuses on Consequences, 56 ALB. L. REv. 701, 713-15 (1993).
83. JUENGER, supra note 1. at 1.

84. Id. at 89 n.544. See, e.g., REESE ET AL., supra note 13, at 384-95.
85.

120 N.E. 198 (N.Y. 1918).

86. 3 N.E.2d 597 (N.Y. 1936).
87. 203 N.E.2d 210 (N.Y. 1964).
88. Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
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is based on the culpability of the defendant and has a low cap. In his
typically rhythmic prose, Judge Cardozo draws a narrow compass in
which courts may use public policy to deny enforcement to foreign law:
"[t]hey do not close their doors, unless help would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals,
some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal."8 9 Mertz refuses to
permit a suit between New York spouses, even though Connecticut,
where the injuries occurred and whose law was assumed to be applicable,
had abolished marital immunity. Judge Lehman redefines "public policy"
so expansively that professors who teach conflict of laws would have to
find other employment: "a state can have no public policy except what
is to be found in its Constitution and laws." 9 Intercontinental Hotels
reaffirms Cardozo's view of public policy, 9' magnanimously enforces a
Puerto Rican gambling casino debt against a New York tourist, and en
route explains Judge Lehman's opinion in Mertz, not as a chauvinistic
aberration, but as an insightful anticipation of modem consequences-based
choice of law. 92
The problem with this explanation of Mertz is that if Judge Lehman
were choosing New York law to determine the issue of marital immunity
between New York spouses, the result would have been a judgment on
the merits for the defendant rather than closing New York courthouse
doors, leaving the wife theoretically free to sue her husband in Connecticut.93 More significantly, Intercontinental Hotels continues to view
"public policy" as a possible escape from Puerto Rican law chosen by
putting a pin in the map where the gambling "obligations [were] validly
entered into . . . ,94 The majority rejects use of the doctrine, because
enforcing a Puerto Rican gambling debt would not shock New Yorkers
who already engaged in legal wagering on bingo and horses. 95 The two
dissenters disagree only in the extent of their disapproval of casino
gambling: "we cannot in good conscience use our judicial 96
processes to
recognize the gamester's claim by giving him a judgment.,
89. Loucks, 120 N.E. at 202.
90. Mertz, 3 N.E.2d at 599.
91. Intercontinental Hotels, 203 N.E.2d at 212.
92. Id. at 213 (stating that Judge Lehman "was in reality ...

making a choice of law

decision of the kind that this court today follows under the nominal heading of the 'contacts'
doctrine") (emphasis in original).
93. See Mertz, 3 N.E.2d at 598 (defining the issue as "whether a wife residing here may
resort to the courts of this state to enforce liability for a wrong committed outside of the state
94. IntercontinentalHotels, 203 N.E.2d at 211.
95. Id. at 213.
96. Id. at 215 (Desmond, C.J., dissenting, joined by Van Voorhis, J.).
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If the court had appreciated the implications of its opinion the
previous year in Babcock,' "public policy" would have been brought in
the front door and used to choose between Puerto Rican and New York
law to determine the merits of the underlying claim. Majority and dissent
would read something like this:
BURKE-WEINTRAUB, Judge.
Debts incurred at government-licensed gambling casinos are legal and
enforceable under the law of Puerto Rico. In New York, there are no
licensed casinos, the transaction would be criminal, and the debts unenforceable. Should we apply Puerto Rican or New York law when, as in
this case, a New Yorker goes to Puerto Rico to frolic, but now seeks safe
haven in his own state? We choose Puerto Rican law. This is a true
conflict. New York policies against gambling, diminished though they are
by our increasingly permissive society, will be diminished further by
enforcing a debt illegal under our law. Puerto Rican policies of enforcing
gambling obligations incurred in its licensed casinos will be thwarted if
tourists can scurry back home and find refuge. We do not wish to
encourage our citizens to renege on debts legal where incurred. Applying
our law will completely frustrate Puerto Rican policy. Applying Puerto
Rican law will have less drastic consequences here.98 Our view of
gambling debts is based in large part on a desire to protect the family
from the folly of its breadwinner. "Puerto Rico has made provision for
this kind of imprudence by allowing the court to reduce gambling
obligations or even decline to enforce them altogether, if the court in its
discretion finds that the losses are '[in an] amount [which] may exceed
the customs of a good father of a family.""'
DESMOND-WEINTRAUB, Chief Judge (dissenting).
We should apply New York law and render a judgment on the merits
for the defendant. The casino knew or could easily have learned that it
was extending credit to a New Yorker. This is not an interstate commercial transaction, such as a construction loan, that should counsel caution
before we announce to the world that they had better not deal with our
residents except on our terms, because their claims will be cast to wind
if brought here. What have we to fear, that Puerto Rican gambling

97. Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).

98. For advocacy of this sort of "comparative impairment" method of resolving choice-oflaw problems, see William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the FederalSystem, 16 STAN. L. REv.
1, 18 (1963). Intercontinental Hotels is one of the rare cases in which the methodology is
reasonably cogent. Typically the determination that one state's policies would be more impaired
if its law is not applied, is in the eyes of the beholder. See, e.g., Bernhard v. Harrah's Club,
546 P.2d 719 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976), in which the court unconvincingly

utilizes comparative impairment to apply California liability law to a Nevada liquor seller.
99. IntercontinentalHotels, 203 N.E.2d at 213 (Burke, J.) (brackets in original).
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casinos will be reluctant to extend credit to New York tourists? I am not
disheartened by that prospect.
Thus, under a modem consequences-based approach to choice of law,
respectable arguments can be made for either side in Intercontinental
Hotels. This is hardly a sign of chaos or confusion if those arguments are
jargon-free and address the underlying social issues.
III. MULTISTATE RULES OF DECISION

One method of resolving international choice-of-law problems is to
leave conflicting domestic rules in place for local controversies, but
replace them in international transactions with a uniform super law. This
method is rarely used. An example of the wise use of super law is the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods," 0 which has been ratified by thirty-four countries, including the
United States.'0 ' The Sale of Goods Convention provides modern and
sensible rules. An example of bad super law is the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air," alias the "Warsaw Convention." This gem reduces litigation of
claims arising from international air flights by setting liability limits so
low that there is no dispute over the amount of compensation."°3 Basic
plaintiff strategy is to escape from the Convention's compensation
shackles by proving "wilful misconduct""''° or by suing defendants not
protected by the Convention, such as airplane and component parts
manufacturers.0 5
There is something of a vogue for the choice of super law in international commercial agreements. The Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration'0 6 provides tat "[t]he arbitral tribunal shall
100. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, opened
for signature Apr. 11, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 671.
101. See MARTINDALE-HUBBELL INT'L L. DIG., pt. VII, at IIC-34 (1993).

102. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Regarding International Transport,
opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 300, 137 L.N.T.S. 11.
103. Id. art. 22.
104. Id. art. 25. See In re Korean Airlines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475
(D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 616 (1991).
105. See In re Paris Air Crash of Mar. 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975). This
is one of the cases used by Juenger as an example of practical international choice-of-law
problems. JUENGER, supra note 1, at 2. Another target defendant is the United States, for
actions of air traffic controllers. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 932 F.2d at 1477
(summary judgment entered for the United States).
106. UNCITRAL Model Law on InternationalCommercialArbitration, U.N. GAOR, 40th
Sess., Supp. No. 17, Annex 1, at 81-93, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M.
1302 (1985) [hereinafter Model Law]. The legislative history of the Model Law is provided at
U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 17, ch. II, at 5-65, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (1985), reprinted
in 24 I.L.M. 1314.
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decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur only if the parties
have expressly authorized it to do so.""'° These concepts derive from civil
law tradition and enable an arbitrator to decide according to the arbitrator's concept of what is fair and reasonable under the circumstances,
rather than according to legal rules linked to a particular national system.
The doctrines are likely to have most influence in awarding damages and
interest. A related doctrine is that of lex mercatoria,0 8 customs and
usages of international trade common to all or most industrial states or,
at least, to those states connected with the parties or the transaction.
Courts have given some encouragement to parties who are sufficiently
daring to submit their agreements to the law of everywhere and nowhere.
In Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaft m.b.H v. R'as al
Khaimah National Oil Co.,'09 the court stated that it was not against
public policy to enforce a Swiss arbitration award that was based on the
''proper law to . . . be decided by the arbitrators and ... not ... confined
. . . to national systems of law."" 0 The court noted that the parties
intended to give the arbitrators this freedom, intended "to create legally
enforceable rights and liabilities," and that the resulting agreement had
"the requisite degree of certainty.""' The court also noted that the issue
was addressed only because counsel informed the court that "this was a
matter of considerable importance to those engaged in international
commerce," but that "in the instant case the decision of the arbitrators
rested primarily, if not exclusively, on findings of fact ....
Sometimes, however, as in Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Balfour
Beatty Construction Ltd.,"' courts barely conceal their astonishment at
such contractual daring. The contract for construction of the Channel
Tunnel stated that it was "governed by and interpreted in accordance with
the principles common to both English law and French law, and in the
absence of such common principles by such general principles of international trade law as have been applied by national and international
tribunals."" 4 Under the contract, the concessionaires, who held the

107. Model Law, supra note 106, art. 28(3).
108. JUENGER, supra note 1, at 16.

109. Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaft m.b.H. v. R'as al Khaimah National
Oil Co., [1987] 3 W.L.R. 1023 (Ct. App. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, [1990] 1 App. Cas.
295 (appeal taken from Eng.).
110. Id. at 1035.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Channel Tunnel Group, Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd., [1993] 2 W.L.R.
262 (H.L. 1993) (appeal taken from Eng.).
114. Id. at 271.
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concession granted by England and France for the construction and
operation of the tunnel, were entitled to issue orders to the building
contractor for additional work not covered by the compensation terms of
the contract." 5 If the concessionaires and contractor could not agree on
the price for the additional work, the dispute was to be referred to a panel
of experts and, if the parties were not satisfied with the panel's decision,
settled by arbitration in Brussels under the rules of the International
Chamber of Commerce." 6 In the meantime, the contractor was obliged to
continue work. 1 17 A major item of additional work, a cooling system, was
ordered by the concessionaires. The parties could not agree on the price,
and the contractor threatened to suspend work on the cooling system
unless the concessionaires agreed and paid the contractor's proposed
price. The concessionaires did not agree and instead commenced an
action for an interim injunction restraining the contractor from suspending
work on the cooling system. The House of Lords approved denial of the
injunction and called attention to the parties' choice of super law:
The parties chose an indeterminate "law" to govern their substantive
rights; an elaborate process for ascertaining those rights; and a
location for that process outside the territories of the participants.
This conspicuously neutral, "anational" and extra-judicial structure
may well have been the right choice for the special needs of the
Channel Tunnel venture. But whether it was right or wrong, it is the
choice which the parties have made. The [concessionaires] now
regret that choice. To push their claim for mandatory relief through
the mechanisms of [the contract] is too slow and cumbersome to suit
their purpose, and they now wish to obtain far reaching relief
through the judicial means which they have been so scrupulous to
exclude. Notwithstanding that the court can and should in the right
case provide reinforcement for the arbitral process by granting
interim relief I am quite satisfied that this is not such a case, and
that to order an injunction here would be to act contrary both to the
general tenor of the construction contract and to the spirit of international arbitration." 8
When super law is drafted by experts and represents the consensus of
the commercial community, it works well and is a preferred solution to
international choice-of-law problems. An example is the Convention on

115. Id. at 268-69.

116. Id. at 270-71.
117. Id. at 270.
118. Id. at 291.
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Contracts for the International Sale of Goods."' It may be that in
arbitration, carefully selected arbitrators can be trusted to decide ex aequo
et bono or as amiable compositeur2 ° or to apply lex mercatoria.m
Particularly in the shaping of remedies for breach of contract, wise and
informed discretion may be better than one-size-fits-all rules. The Restatement of Contracts recognizes this." If matters go badly wrong,
however, and the super law genie is out of the bottle, what seemed like
a good idea at the drafting stage may produce a fiasco."

IV.

BETTER LAW AND ALTERNATIVE REFERENCES

Some of the most intractable choice-of-law problems arise in product
liability class actions when the same defective product has injured
thousands of users in many jurisdictions with diverse laws. It is tempting
to facilitate mass processing of these disputes by selecting a single law
to apply to all claims. Absent a super law provided by treaty or federal
preemption, a choice-of-law rule must govern the selection of the single
law. Juenger suggests the following:
In selecting the rules of decision applicable to any issue a multistate
liability case presents the court will take into account the laws of the
following jurisdictions:
(a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where
the conduct causing the injury occurred, and (c) the home
state (habitual residence, place of incorporation or principal
place of business) of the parties. As to each issue, the court
shall select from the laws of these jurisdictions the rule of
decision that most closely accords with modern products
liability standards. 24
One virtue of this choice-of-law rule is that it "requires a separate
choice for each issue presented."'125 Thus, compensation issues can be
treated differently from punitive damages issues. 26 The problem with the

119.
120.
121.
122.

See
See
See
See

supra text accompanying notes 100-01.
supra text accompanying notes 106-08.
supra note 108 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 351(3) (1979) (stating that "[a] court

may limit damages for foreseeable loss by excluding recovery for loss of profits, by allowing
recovery only for loss incurred in reliance, or otherwise if it concludes that in the circumstances
justice so requires in order to avoid disproportionate compensation.").
123.
124.
125.
126.

See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
JUENOER, supra note 1, at 196-97.
Id. at 197.
See Willis L. M. Reese, Substantive Policies and Choice of Law, 2 TouRo L. REV.
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rule is that if one law is to be selected from states having the designated
contacts, the only contacts clustered in a single state are likely to be the
place of conduct causing the injury and the place of incorporation or
principal place of business of the manufacturer. The "conduct causing the
injury" will be the place of manufacture or the place at which key
marketing decisions were made. The manufacturer can control these
contacts, and states may be tempted to provide product liability havens
where manufacturers can incorporate, establish offices, and draft warnings
with no concern but the bottom line. It may make more sense to give
each user the protection of his or her own home state law, such as it is,
if this is fair to the manufacturer, because the product is distributed there.
If the user's law is favorable to consumers, fine. If not, some courts have
placed their own manufacturers at a worldwide competitive disadvantage
by applying law more favorable to the consumer than the consumer's
own law, 7 but most courts have had better sense than that. 2 1 If the
manufacturer is truly a bad actor that has dumped a dangerously defective
product abroad, that is another matter. Now the state where the manufacturer is headquartered may wish to deter and punish such conduct by
applying its own law, to both liability and damages, if this is more
favorable to the user than the law of the user's home state.
Of course, in a class action with geographically dispersed injuries,
choosing the law of the consumer's home state will end the possibility of
applying a single law to all claims. Perhaps the number of truly different
laws will be small enough that the class action is still manageable. If not,
in product liability cases it is better to reach a just result by a longer
route than to produce injustice efficiently.
Professor Juenger is least iconoclastic in his approval of the choiceof-law rule that has achieved universal acclaim - the parties may choose
the law to govern the validity and construction of their contract.2 9 Party
autonomy is fine for construction. To fill in gaps they have left in their
agreement, the parties may wish to select the law of some commercial
center that has no contact with them or their transaction. 130 With regard

1, 14 (1986) (stating that punitive damages should be determined by the law of the state where
defendant acted or of another "state which has a close relationship with the defendant .... ).
127. See Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd on another issue,
454 U.S. 235 (1981).
128. See Deemer v. Silk City Textile Mach. Co., 475 A.2d 648, 652 (N.J. App. 1984).
129. JUENGER, supra note 1, at 55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 187 (1969).
130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 129, § 187 (1)

(allowing the parties to choose any law "to govern their contractual rights and duties ... if the
particular issue is one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their
agreement directed to that issue.").
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to issues of validity, however, the parties would be better served by an

alternative reference rule applying the law that will validate their agreement. This gives them all that they could legitimately achieve by party
autonomy and end the nonsense of wondering what to do if, as occurs
with embarrassing frequency, the parties inadvertently choose a law that
invalidates a key term of their agreement. 131
The book is a treasure. What preceded is a sample of meditations and
comments triggered by Juenger's wide-ranging learning and wisdom. It
is more fun debating him in person than addressing an empty chair. I
assure you, the book is not empty.

131. See, e.g., Boatland, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 558 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1977); Foreman
v. George Foreman Assoc., Ltd., 517 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1975).
The Restatement sensibly counsels ignoring the choice-of-law clause under these
circumstances as an obvious mistake. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

supra note 129, § 187 cmt. e. Professor Kramer contends that the assumption that the choice
of an invalidating law was inadvertent is not always warranted. See Larry Kramer, Rethinking
Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 332 (1990):

The parties' mistake may have been in adding the substantive provision that renders
the contract invalid under the chosen law. Boilerplate, after all, is not limited to
choice of law clauses. Moreover, the assumption that the choice of an invalidating
law was inadvertent makes no sense at all when the dispute turns on facts that were
not apparent when the contract was made, such as cases concerning the validity of
an oral modification. On the contrary, a law that precludes enforcement may be
precisely what the parties bargained for in such cases.
If the "boilerplate" is a drafting error, reformation will correct the mistake. See Goode v. Riley,
28 N.E. 228 (1891). As for oral modifications, a wise decision as to enforcement depends upon
whether the party opposing enforcement did not intend to be bound by the alleged modification
and whether this intention can be imposed on the other under proper standards of interpretation.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 122, § 201. This process would be

aborted by enforcing a choice-of-law clause choosing a law that invalidated oral modifications
(see, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-209(2)) except as that law is a reasonable indication of the parties'
intention. There may be a purely pragmatic reason for enforcing a clause that chooses
invalidating law. The contract may have a severance clause permitting enforcement of the part
left unaffected by invalidation and the parties may be willing to sacrifice part of the agreement
in order to avoid exploring the conflicts wilderness without the compass of a choice-of-law
clause.

